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RESPONSES TO ECONOMIC CRISIS
Bailouts, Buy-Ins, 
and Ballyhoo
Robert Hockett
The bailout strategy now being pursued by Treasury 
under the recently authorized Troubled Asset Relief 
Plan, if “strategy” it can be called, remains obscure 
and erratic at best. All the while markets remain 
jittery and credit remains tight, as the underlying 
source of our present fi nancial jitters—continued 
decline in the housing market and still mounting 
foreclosures—goes unaddressed. This piece proposes 
an interesting and novel approach to solving the 
fi nancial problem. If it works out, it would eventually 
minimize the cost to the government.
AFTER A NUMBER OF HEADY FALSE STARTS, against the backdrop of threatened fi nancial catastrophe, Congress and the White House enacted a stopgap fi nancial “bailout” plan early in 
October 2008.1 The “Troubled Asset Relief Plan” (TARP, “the Plan”) 
is remarkable in a multitude of respects. As a fi scal matter, for one 
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thing, the Plan’s sheer size—$700 billion, with no assurance that this 
will be all—appears to be unprecedented. It dwarfs even the costs of 
the S&L cleanup nearly two decades ago, remarkable as these were in 
their own day. As a legal matter, for another thing, the sheer breadth 
of barely reviewable discretion that the TARP confers upon Treasury 
presses hard against constitutional limits on executive branch author-
ity. Indeed, lawyers seem largely agreed that the original three-page 
version of the Plan might well have delegated authority in excess of 
what the Constitution permits, while the amended 400-page version 
squeaks by at best.
At least as striking as the TARP’s fi scal scale and delegated executive 
scope, however, has been the remarkably restless character of Treasury’s 
actions taken under the Plan since enactment. Fed chairman Ben 
Bernanke, President George W. Bush, and Treasury Secretary Henry 
Paulson originally projected the TARP, late in September 2008, as a 
proposed “buy-up” of mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) said to be 
clogging the credit markets. Next Treasury began speaking instead, 
about mid-October 2008, of “buying in” to fi nancial institutions. 
This, it was said, would make lendable funds more immediately 
available to lenders, hence restoring liquidity to credit markets more 
expeditiously.
By early November, Treasury was reporting that the buy-in plan 
would entirely supplant the earlier buy-up plan. About mid-November, 
however, Treasury abruptly announced it would enter the short-term 
debt markets as well, once again “buying up,” to get commercial paper 
circulating again. Then, near the end of November, the plan changed 
again. Now, we were told, Treasury would resume purchasing “toxic” 
assets, but more kinds than MBSs. Finally, in early December, talk 
had turned toward employing some of the TARP moneys to tide over 
automakers as well, a course of action that by the new year had indeed 
begun to be taken. The term “erratic,” it seemed, could be used to 
describe more than presidential candidates in those days.
Throughout all the on-a-dime pivots and changes of direction, a few 
voices softer than Treasury’s have been offering proposals aimed at 
the primary cause of our present fi nancial worries. That is the ongoing 
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mortgage foreclosure crisis affl icting our post-bubble real estate mar-
kets. With time and continued tumult, these proposals have gradually 
come to be more widely heard. Now it is not only Sheila Bair, Repub-
lican chair of the FDIC, who can be added to the list of those arguing 
that mortgage foreclosures lie at the core of our woes—a list that since 
autumn has included not only progressive housing advocates but also 
fi nanciers and economists as ideologically diverse as Democrats George 
Soros and Joseph Stiglitz and Republican Glenn Hubbard. No, now 
even Fed Chair Bernanke and Treasury Secretary Paulson acknowledge 
the need to stabilize free-falling mortgage markets.
It is very good news that so many at last are now looking to stem 
the foreclosure crisis as the best means of addressing the present fi -
nancial crisis. However badly needed the “transfusion” supplied by 
the fi rst half of Treasury’s new $700 billion might have been to keep 
the “patients” that are our national and global fi nancial systems alive 
on the table, the fact is that these patients—and the public fi sc—will 
continue to hemorrhage until we stanch the fl ow of foreclosures that 
is still under way. The only real question is how best to do that.
A brief bit of forgotten institutional history, I believe, supplies 
our answer: The most effective—as well as the most constitutionally 
sound—way to solve the mortgage crisis, and thereby a looming na-
tional and indeed global fi nancial crisis as well, is to direct the new 
Treasury, as of January 21, 2009, to administer the TARP through 
twinned institutions we already have. They both were originally estab-
lished decades ago precisely to deal effi ciently with low-end mortgage 
fi nance and refi nance, which remains their purpose. Indeed they were 
founded to do so precisely in order to deal with the real estate crisis 
that immediately preceded (one shudders to say it) a certain notori-
ous Wall Street contraction—one that commenced in October 1929. 
Our present woes, moreover, stem directly from intrusions upon these 
institutions’ original missions by underregulated private fi rms, fi rst 
in the lead-up to, then during, the near-decade-long housing bubble 
that grew from the late 1990s to about 2006.
What institutions? you might now be asking. I am referring to the 
Federal Housing Administration (FHA), working in tandem with its 
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originally government-sponsored and recently re-federalized sibling 
enterprises (GSEs), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Any properly focused 
plan for fi nancial bailout will critically involve what amounts to 
these institutions’ original, and now recently restored, bailiwick. To 
see why and how this is so, we should begin with a brief refresher on 
the cause of the problems we are presently dealing with. I will then 
briefl y reprise the founding and functioning of our newly restored 
team of mortgage fi nance institutions. Then I close with a sketch of 
how TARP now should be channeled through these institutions.
Where We Are and How We Got Here
Let us begin by noting two salient components of the present crisis. 
The fi rst, what I will call “core,” component is the doubtful value of 
an uncertain number of “subprime,” “Alt-A,” and “jumbo ARM” MBSs. 
These are held in varying quantities by a large number of fi nancial 
institutions (FIs) worldwide, many of which appear not as yet to have 
fully reported the sizes of their holdings. These securities, moreover, 
underlie fi nancial derivative commitments on the part of yet more 
FIs worldwide, with notional values that appear likewise as yet to be 
underreported. The MBSs, for their part, are now widely perceived 
to be “toxic” because many—though certainly not all and indeed not 
even a majority—of the mortgages backing them are troubled.2
Now many of the mentioned mortgages are troubled, in turn, 
because they were imprudently or in some cases “predatorily” ex-
tended by participants in the shadow industry of scarcely regulated 
“mortgage banks” that developed and then grew in the vacuum left 
by those S&Ls lost in the 1990s.3 These institutions, most of which are 
not, legally speaking, banks at all—they take no deposits and are not 
regulated as depository institutions—proliferated rapidly with, while 
indeed helping to fuel, our recent Fed-enabled real estate bubble.4 
Naive, non-credit-checked, and in some cases clearly uncreditworthy 
borrowers not only received loans from these institutions but often 
were lured with offers of newfangled adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) 
featuring low front-end “teaser” payments that later “ballooned.” 
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Understanding how this could have happened will take us straight 
to the second penumbral component of our present crisis—as well as 
to how we will best solve it.
Now ordinarily, neither borrowers nor lenders would likely have 
expected anything good to come of loans on such terms as those 
I have just mentioned. But fees, risk transferability, and especially 
speculative asset bubbles have a funny way of changing people’s 
calculations. Borrowers not unreasonably assume they can regularly 
refi nance inexpensively, on the strength of the underlying collateral’s 
apparently inexorable appreciation. Primary and secondary lenders 
naturally assume likewise. And again, such assumptions seem far from 
far-fetched while the bubble is growing. The Fed chairman himself 
said as much at the time, saying the buyers would be irrational not 
to take up ARMs.5
Borrowers, then, need not be profl igate to “get in” what later proves 
“too deep” when it comes to levered asset purchases. And lenders, for 
their part, need not be venal: They can reasonably endorse borrowers’ 
best hopes, even when lured by origination and loan servicing fees, 
and by the easy sale of resultant mortgages to secondary holders. The 
secondary holders, for their part, indeed add to the pressure. Often 
they prod loan originators on, as seems to have happened quite widely 
this time. Why? Perhaps partly because they assume the originators 
have done the due diligence. But they are lured in any event by the 
returns on investments that are there to be had while a bubble’s in-
fl ating, even if there be defaults here and there. The highest rewards 
always are associated with some risk, after all.
For a time in these cases—often for years—everyone does indeed 
win. The process takes on a self-fulfi llingly prophetic, spontaneous 
“chain letter” or Ponzi-like character. More are drawn into the mar-
ket as prices keep rising. Some hope to clear speculative profi ts by 
“fl ipping” the assets they borrow to buy. Others—more innocently, 
perhaps—reasonably judge they can prudently purchase to hold, but 
on more highly levered terms than they might otherwise have ac-
cepted. And still others are mixed cases of holder-cum-speculator.6 In 
all cases, in any event, as the new entrants keep entering, the prices 
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do keep rising, in effect validating the judgments of those who act 
upon the expectation of continued ascent.
As this process continues, some begin to believe, while others per-
haps labor to convince themselves, that we have entered upon some 
permanent “new era,” from which point onward asset values quite 
generally “can only go up.” Others, somewhat more modestly, con-
vince themselves simply that the particular asset in question—land or 
petroleum, say—is in fi nite supply. Since populations and long-term 
demand know no limits, they conclude not implausibly that this one 
“can only go up.” Others, fi nally, remain fairly certain that all that 
goes up can come down. But they know that they cannot know when 
the descent will begin, so they keep hanging on anxiously, day by 
day, in hopes of gleaning just that much more profi t before exiting. 
It is in each participant’s rational interest, after all, to ride the thing 
up to that asymptote which is the very infl ection point. So most keep 
on riding.
But, of course, bubbles never grow indefi nitely; the infl ection point 
always is reached. The Ponzi growth rate slows at some point in the 
indefi nite medium term, whatever the more defi nite, long-term trend 
lines might be.7 When that happens, the spontaneous Ponzi process 
abruptly halts and then quickly reverses. The buildup of worry—
“how long can this last?”—discharges at last. A “Minsky Moment” is 
reached.8 Now many erstwhile winners, having been nervously mind-
ful all along that a peak followed by mass exit must at some point be 
reached, seek to salvage gains or cut losses by being fi rst to jump ship. 
“Sauve qui peut,” “Die Letzen beissen die Hunde,” or “Devil take the 
hindmost,” as used to be said on the French, German, and English 
markets, respectively. But in modern, electronically traded markets, 
the time span between fi rst and last is paper thin. Prices plunge very 
quickly, and with them the reliability of those repayment obligations 
associated with the credit extensions that fueled the rise.
This is the fate that befell our own housing bubble quite recently. 
Prices leveled off, then began falling in mid-2006. The ensuing slump 
quickly began to throw ill-structured, bubble-time mortgages into 
default, as market valuations of underlying assets began falling below 
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nominal debt obligations. Default rates, not surprisingly, have since 
grown steadily. And as they have grown, the market values of mort-
gages, mortgage-backed securities, and associated derivative obligations 
have dropped yet further. In effect, the same feedback loop structure 
that characterized the buildup now characterizes the comedown.
The second penumbral component of our mortgage-rooted fi nancial 
crisis accordingly is, no pun intended, derivative. It is mass-psychologi-
cal, simply the fl ip side of the just described Ponzi process: A proverbial 
“market for lemons” of the sort known to macroeconomists since at 
least the time of Akerlof’s and Stiglitz’s canonical articles of the early 
1970s (for which, of course, both won Nobels), and to fi nanciers since 
Gresham fi rst postulated the “Law” bearing his name, follows many 
a burst bubble.9 The prevailing mood changes, tendencies toward risk 
aversion are heightened, and uncertainties are resolved by assuming 
the worst.
In the present iteration of this depressingly familiar story, no 
institutions or persons know precisely what portions of their own 
MBS holdings will prove “underperforming” in consequence of the 
mortgage industry’s post-crash troubles. That is partly because no one 
knows precisely which mortgages will foreclose, thus which securities 
will prove underperforming or how much. And it is partly because 
no one knows how low particular property values, or property val-
ues more generally, will fall. And fi nally it is partly because property 
values, hence mortgage and thus MBS values, are themselves partly 
determined by whatever action we collectively take or do not take to 
prevent defaults. There is a signifi cant element of self-fulfi lling proph-
ecy in whatever we do here, just as there was self-fulfi lling prophecy in 
the growth of the Ponzi-like bubble itself. And so until action on the 
part of the collectivity is taken by some agent authorized to act in the 
name of all, each private party assumes the worst and seeks exit.
This self-fulfi lling–prophecy part of the story steadily radiates out-
ward: The market grows ever more jittery over the just enumerated 
uncertainties. The longer these jitters endure, the more prone investors 
become to undervalue affected fi nancial institutions’ MBS—including 
portfolios, and hence ultimately those institutions’ own issuances. 
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The more they consequently shed their stakes in these institutions, 
the more quickly the remaining such stakes lose their short-run values. 
In effect, there is a “run on the banks,” in this case by shareholders 
rather than depositors, as used to happened before there was federal 
deposit insurance. The negative feedback loop found in the market 
for MBSs accordingly spreads beyond those securities. The familiar 
fi nancial “contagion” ensues.
The process, of course, is aided and abetted by mark-to-market ac-
counting rules that require institutions to value their assets as the 
market values them—even when, thanks to the panic psychology at 
work here, the market arguably is grossly undervaluing them. And with 
affected institutions in turn interlinked by collateralized debt obliga-
tions, credit-default swaps, and other derivative risk-sharing arrange-
ments, even those not holding MBSs end up affected. The “downward 
spiral” winds steadily downward. But what goes down can be turned 
back up and be brought to a much more sustainable stratum.
Enter the FHA and its GSE siblings: We can quickly reverse the wid-
ening downward spiral that is this crisis’s penumbral component, as 
Treasury’s original late–September 2008 plan itself contemplated, by 
directly addressing the cause at its core—the bad mortgages and the 
securities they back. And this is precisely what the FHA and its newly 
renationalized GSEs originally were and are for. Let us look, then, a 
bit further back than the heady early and dismal later 2000s, to the 
heady mid- and dismal later 1920s and 1930s.
Where We Were and How We Got There
Public memory of the era immediately preceding the New Deal fea-
tures three gaps that we would do well now to fi ll. One such forgotten 
fact is that, before there was a “World War II,” “World War I” was 
called “The Great War.” The second forgotten fact is that the 1929 
stock market “crash” commonly singled out as having initiated the 
Depression that, thank goodness, we still can call “The Great” was in 
fact but a stage in a longer-term decline. It was immediately preceded 
over that course, moreover, by a crash in the real estate market—most 
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notably, perhaps, in Florida, in which none other than Charles Ponzi 
himself had loomed large.10
Finally, the third fact that we have forgotten is that the system of 
home mortgage fi nance that has made America “a nation of home 
owners,” as well as introducing the fi nancial innovation known as 
“securitization” itself, was actually designed and then instituted over 
the course of the 1930s and 1940s—precisely in response to the just 
mentioned real estate crisis.11 Before that time, less than 40 percent 
of American families owned their own homes, while since that time, 
more than 70 percent have come to enjoy that status. Where homes 
are concerned, in other words, the “ownership society” is a New Deal 
invention. That society, however, along with the mentioned statistic, 
is now under threat—as are, in consequence, our and the world’s fi -
nancial systems—just as they were in the early 1930s.
It is a matter of some urgency rather than mere antiquarian interest, 
then, to recollect this history—as well as to see how our present prob-
lems take root in our having forgotten and departed from it. We must 
act quickly to ensure that the Great Depression remains “Great,” rather 
than becoming just “I.” A bit, then, on the mentioned history.
Early in the twentieth century as now, most who purchased residen-
tial real estate did so at least partly on credit. What was different was 
that fewer, for that reason, purchased housing at all. Housing credit 
markets were more fragmented, mortgages in consequence much 
less liquid investments than they have since become. Home loans in 
consequence were extended for much briefer terms—generally two to 
three years—at the end of which they would “balloon” to come due 
in full.
Loan-to-value ratios before the 1930s, in turn, were very low by 
modern standards. As little as 50 percent was considered high, and it 
was rare. Financing on such terms not surprisingly fell short of most 
would-be buyers’ capacities. And so second mortgages, junior liens, and 
rollover refi nancings were the norm. This was not terribly problematic 
for those who dared buy, so long as real estate values continued to 
rise, as they did—very rapidly—through most of the 1920s. Refi nanc-
ing then, as more recently, was not diffi cult when the value of one’s 
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collateral—the home itself—continued to rise in the real estate boom 
of the twenties.
When real estate prices leveled off and then began falling in 1928, 
however, short-term mortgages no longer could be refi nanced in 
full. Again things were much as they are today. Resultant forced sales 
and foreclosures, which reached the rate of over 1,000 per day once 
some 50 percent of all home mortgages in the country had gone into 
default, brought prices steadily lower. The real estate market fell into 
the familiar “downward spiral.”12 The parallel with today could not 
be more striking.
Indeed the parallels proliferate. For then also, as today, the crisis 
that affl icted the real estate market spread much more widely, ulti-
mately reaching the stock market itself. The reasons were obvious: 
For one thing, upward of 30 percent of the American labor force was 
employed either in the home-building industry itself or in industries 
that were bound to lose business as home builders went out of busi-
ness. For another thing, of course, disemployed labor, like fearful 
and foreclosed mortgagees themselves, spent less money, feeding yet 
further contraction. The vortex of contraction, recession, and then 
depression was on.
The programs instituted to address this widening real estate–rooted 
crisis—begun in the last year of the Hoover administration, broad-
ened through the Roosevelt years, and continuing in but minimally 
altered form today—cannot fail to impress in their innovativeness 
and comprehensiveness. The process began with the Federal Home 
Loan Bank Act (FHLBA) of 1932,13 which authorized establishment of 
a system of Regional Federal Home Loan Banks roughly parallel to 
that of the Federal Reserve’s system of Regional Federal Reserve Banks. 
The Regional Banks provided standards and supervision to member 
institutions—the private mutual savings banks (MSBs) then respon-
sible for most mortgage lending—and in return supplied added lines 
of credit on the security of mortgage loans that they held (in effect 
“monetizing” those mortgages).
The new Congress that took offi ce in 1933 built upon Hoover’s 
well designed initiative. It did so fi rst with a Home Owners’ Loan 
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Act (HOLA) in 1933,14 which temporarily established a Home Own-
ers Loan Corporation (HOLC) for refi nancing foreclosed loans on 
favorable terms to enable erstwhile home owners to recover their 
homes. It also laid the groundwork for a steady spread of more MSBs 
by directly affording national charters even where state authorities 
might have barred entry.
One year later, the National Housing Act (NHA) of 193415 afforded 
a system of deposit insurance for the MSBs analogous to that newly 
instituted for depositors in commercial banks, further boosting the 
availability of lendable deposits. More critically, the NHA instituted 
a system of insurance for the MSBs themselves, against defaulting 
mortgagors: Section 203 of the Act established a nationwide “mutual 
mortgage insurance system” through which a newly created, and in 
this case now permanent, Federal Housing Administration could insure 
fi rst-mortgage loans made for the construction, purchase, or refi nanc-
ing of one-to-four-bedroom family homes. In effect, the FHA took 
over and discharged indefi nitely the functions of the HOLC, which 
from its inception had been conceived as ad hoc and temporary.
FHA still operates today, guaranteeing and, in many cases, originat-
ing or refi nancing mortgages that conform to the standards that it 
imposes (“conforming” mortgages). It also affords fi nancial counseling 
to borrowers. And it does all of this at no cost to the public fi sc—the 
only federal agency to do so.
The FHA and its insurance scheme fundamentally altered the ré-
gime of home fi nancing in the United States. It effectively replaced 
traditional collateralization requirements with national default-risk 
pooling, rendering home loans more affordable. The uniform re-
quirements upon which FHA conditioned its insurance fostered the 
development of a standardized home mortgage instrument marketable 
throughout the country. That is the familiar thirty-year, fi xed-rate 
mortgage so common to low-end mortgage fi nance until recently. 
This in turn opened the door to securitization and hence yet more 
complete risk-pooling, more on which presently. The housing quality 
requirements upon which FHA conditioned its insurance also ensured 
the fi nancial rationality of federally facilitated home-fi nance invest-
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ments. And FHA’s requirements of (a) actuarial soundness, and (b) 
risk classifying and separate pooling ensured that the system retained 
the traditional effi ciencies of a private insurance market. That is why 
it still operates in the black.
Congress effectively completed its ad hoc discovery of our now 
familiar method of fi nancially engineered homeownership spreading 
in 1938 by chartering the fi rst modern “government sponsored enter-
prise” (or GSE). The Federal National Mortgage Association—FNMA, 
or “Fannie Mae”—was charged with making a national market in 
FHA-insured mortgage instruments themselves, i.e., with “securitiz-
ing” those mortgages. In effect, Fannie Mae along with later progeny 
(in particular Ginnie Mae and Freddie Mac, to say nothing of the 
higher-education loan securitizers like Sallie Mae, expressly patterned 
after the Fannie Mae model) closed the proverbial circle, separately 
completing the markets for housing credit and credit-risk bearing, 
thereby optimizing the availability of such credit to home buyers in 
the manner described earlier.
Fannie Mae proved suffi ciently successful, even on market terms, to 
privatize in 1968. (Sallie Mae did so in late 2004.) Freddie, for its part, 
was instituted in 1970 specifi cally to compete with the newly priva-
tized and gargantuan Fannie. Both Fannie and Freddie subsequently 
came to offer a multitude of home fi nance services, and operated 
effectively, as well as profi tably, in spreading home ownership until 
recently.16
What, then, went wrong? In essence, the story is just that told in 
the previous section, albeit now with an added wrinkle. On the one 
hand, Fannie and Freddie were caught up in bubble psychology like 
so many others, including the Fed chairman. It was very profi table 
to buy ever more risky, non-FHA-conforming mortgages so long as 
property values kept growing at the rates they grew in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s. Global investors in Fannie and Freddie, including 
many a large sovereign wealth fund or treasury, insisted that these 
profi ts be sought.
On the other hand and at the same time, in view of their original 
missions as engines of our American home-ownership society, mem-
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bers of Congress and other offi cials during the Clinton and Bush years 
alike, themselves evidently caught up in the belief that real estate 
“could only go up,” in some cases actively pressured the old GSEs to 
take on more risky mortgages. Why not pursue the original salutary 
mission all the more aggressively, if even the Fed chairman was con-
vinced that real estate would just keep rising in value? Finally, in view 
of Fannie’s governmental lineage, Fannie’s and Freddie’s “implicit” 
federal guarantees, and both institutions’ associated “too big to fail” 
status, Fannie and Freddie were all the more able to attract plenty of 
purchasers of their securities.
Ultimately, of course, all of this landed Fannie and Freddie in very 
hot water. The real estate slump that commenced in the summer of 
2006 hit them especially hard, for they held the great bulk of low-end 
mortgages. We know where it led: Fannie and Freddie were ultimately 
renationalized in September 2008. Many took this for an ominous 
sign, on all fours with the totterings of Bear Stearns, Countrywide, 
Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, AIG, and Washington Mutual, among 
others. What we ought really to see in the renationalization of Fannie 
and Freddie, however, is opportunity. And restoration of home values, 
homeownership, and fi nance. That takes us on to the solution of our 
present crisis.
Bringing It All Back Home
With the FHA still in operation as the sole federal agency that oper-
ates at no cost to the public fi sc, and with its prodigal siblings now 
back in the family, we are actually now very well situated to address 
the mortgage crisis at the core of our imminent global fi nancial cri-
sis. Indeed we can easily set the team to work in a manner a lot like 
the manner in which it operated in solving that real estate crisis that 
prompted its founding in the fi rst place. Here is how to do it.
First, through the now newly refederalized GSEs, employ TARP moneys 
to purchase and repurchase MBSs perceived as “toxic” or “troubled” 
from key fi nancial institutions now holding them. Pay more than 
currently undervalued market, but less than discounted cash-fl ow 
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value. That way, value will be recouped as MBSs rise back to less 
panic-depressed values. And that way, we will also ensure that fi nan-
cial institutions that overinvested in MBSs incur some cost, thereby 
mitigating the moral hazard concerns occasioned by any bailout. In 
effect, we will be taking a “deductible,” or conferring the attributes 
of “coinsurance” on the bailout.
How much more than currently undervalued market, but lower 
than discounted cash-fl ow value, should we pay out? Many methods 
have been proposed, best known among them probably the “reverse 
auction” fi rst suggested by Treasury in September 2008. Reverse 
auctioning certainly seems the most effi cient means of dividing the 
surplus that we will be recouping. But we shall do best to prescind 
here from fi ne-tuned accounting and valuation matters, as there is 
surely a range of reasonable possibilities from which to choose. What 
matters for the present is that MBSs are certainly much undervalued 
at present by a spooked market, for the same psychological reasons as 
for their having been overvalued by our erstwhile euphoric market. 
And this fact itself, if there is more or less symmetry between, fi rst, 
the euphoric and then the dejected “animal spirits” at work in the 
MBS market this decade, suggests somewhere near the mean between 
peak and trough rates as a good working benchmark against which 
to check observed auction rates, perhaps marginally adjusted in rec-
ognition of any asymmetry thought to be worked by endowment or 
related effects.
Will the MBSs rise back to higher values as suggested? Yes, for rea-
sons rooted in the “market for lemons” and “self-fulfi lling prophecy” 
phenomena noted above. The problem in this case is that, while we 
know that only a small minority of mortgages will actually default and 
only a minority of MBSs will actually prove to be “toxic,” we do not 
know which ones. During those periods of irrational despair that fol-
low periods of irrational exuberance, individuals irrationally fear that 
they are holding the underperforming investments disproportionately. 
Let us call it a “reverse Wobegon” problem: Each individual worries, 
“I might have only the bad ones.”17 Fearing this individually, they 
then in effect make it so collectively, by stampeding to sell what they 
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irrationally undervalue. In short, we have a classic collective-action 
problem, one that in this case artifi cially defl ates value.
Concentrate ownership of the full affected portfolio, then, and you 
address this collective action problem head-on and entirely solve it. 
Each security then can effectively be valued at the mean, without 
anyone’s having to know which particular securities in fact possess 
more or less than mean value. The problem of individuals’ all fear-
ing that they hold securities possessed of less than mean value—the 
“reverse Wobegon problem”—is immediately solved. We restore full 
portfolio value, in short, precisely by concentrating ownership of the 
full portfolio, booking the difference between that and the current 
irrationally depressed market value of dispersed securities. Concen-
trating ownership also, it happens, will facilitate smooth operation 
of the second part of the FHA/GSE plan that I am proposing, the part 
that restores value to underlying mortgages themselves. On, then, to 
that.
The second and complementary part of the plan is, in this case 
through the FHA, simultaneously to arrange refi nancing and fi nancial 
counseling for those mortgagees who, owing to poorly structured or 
misleadingly packaged mortgages, are now going under. Make a prior-
ity of fi rst-time single-home buyers who have purchased the homes to 
occupy them and who might realistically pay for them if only their pay-
ment structures are smoothed. Show less solicitude for “second” or “nth” 
homes that clearly are speculative properties purchased for “fl ipping,” 
unless there is a good chance of saving foreclosure costs by refi nancing. 
Show intermediate solicitude for those who, though not strictly specula-
tors, have nonetheless grossly overreached, helping to refi nance some 
while gradualizing workouts and foreclosures on others. The FHA is 
quite experienced with all of these options and more.
Note that all of this can be done at a reasonable, unforced pace once 
FHA’s sibling GSEs have purchased or repurchased the great bulk of 
MBSs per the fi rst part of the plan. For the newly renationalized GSEs 
do not face the same short-term fi nancial imperatives as private lend-
ers. Nor do they face the bargaining problems that confront dispersed 
classes of creditors in more garden variety insolvency situations. For, 
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yes, debt workouts also are familiarly a collective action problem, as 
any bankruptcy expert will readily attest. This is yet another benefi t 
of concentrating ownership of these now troubled assets in the hands 
of our GSEs. And it will enhance the value of the assets themselves, 
precisely by preventing massive foreclosures and their associated costs 
and thus preserving the value of those mortgages that underlie the 
presently “toxic” MBSs.
It bears noting here that the FHA can effect mortgage refi nancings 
much more effi ciently than judges or any new cadre of bankruptcy 
trustees of the sort that some are proposing would do. For one thing, 
again, refi nancing is already an FHA specialty. But for another, it is 
because the GSEs’ repurchasing of MBSs will eliminate the usual 
holdout problems that affl ict ordinary debt workouts in the vicinity 
of court-administered bankruptcy. I think that this renders the paired 
FHA/GSE plan superior, moreover, to Professor Shiller’s proposal for 
a new HOLC.18 For the latter would not only just recreate an agency 
that the FHA was itself instituted to replace and make permanent, but 
also it would not yield the concentrated MBS-ownership advantages 
that this plan involves.
Offer to buy troubled MBSs, then, and most who now hold them will 
sell. Then we can refi nance mortgages with speed, but with deliberate 
speed—without pressure. As for any who do not sell their MBSs per 
the plan, note fi rst that they would have to constitute one-third of the 
mortgage credit outstanding on any one home if they wished to block 
refi nancing. That seems unlikely. Note fi nally that if, improbably, they 
were to constitute such a bloc and then seek to obstruct refi nancing 
arrangements by FHA, there would surely be suffi cient ground for 
the government to exercise its eminent domain power and pay the 
amount paid to the last—or indeed even the fi rst—voluntary sellers of 
MBSs to the holdouts. A securities covenant is no more a suicide pact 
than is the Constitution, and there is no reason whatever to honor 
exploitative holdout power in times of exigency like the present. If 
anything, there is reason to shame holdouts publicly, along with the 
worst of that comparative minority of borrowers and lenders who 
were grossly negligent in the midst of the bubble.
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So how much will all of this cost? That is, of course, hard to say, 
in view of the feedback-effect-rooted indeterminacies that we have 
noted to be at work in the present crisis. The best we can reasonably 
expect at the present, I think, is to take cognizance of the range of 
reasonably anticipated possibilities. At one end of this range is the 
possibility that the FHA and its renationalized GSE siblings will actu-
ally come out in the black. Certainly that is what happened from the 
late 1930s onward, when the original package was fi rst put into place. 
And indeed it is why Fannie was ultimately privatized, and it is why 
the FHA has operated at a profi t since its inception. It also bears not-
ing that Bernanke, Bush, and Paulson themselves argued that TARP, 
even without the salvaging of MBS values that refi nancing mortgages 
would effect, could well bring a net gain to the fi sc in the end.
How about the less rosy end of the range of possibilities? That one 
is just a bit harder to estimate, in part because of the aforementioned 
feedback-effect-rooted indeterminacies. It owes also to the counter-
vailing effects of the aforementioned MBS appreciation apt to be 
wrought by concentrated ownership on the one hand, and the MBS 
depreciation apt to be wrought by continued home-value decline and 
foreclosures on the other. Worst-case scenario would be that the full 
amount spent purchasing troubled MBSs would be lost. At present, 
under the TARP, that would be about $350 billion—the remaining 
amount now available—plus whatever increment of the fi rst half of 
funds Treasury has already spent upon MBSs. One hastens to add, 
however, that this worst-case scenario seems far from plausible, for 
all of the reasons adduced above.
Concluding Thoughts
To our detriment we have long since forgotten how effective FHA 
and its GSE siblings were, upon their founding during the Roosevelt 
era, in ending our last mortgage “meltdown.” At literally no ultimate 
cost to the public fi sc—none—they cured that real estate crisis, and in 
so doing transformed us from a nation in which less than 40 percent 
owned their homes to a nation in which 70 percent do.
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Since FHA remains both self-funding and best at what it does, and 
since the GSEs now have been refederalized in keeping with their 
original, pre-privatization mandates, their complementary original 
missions can now be restored. Their mandates are clear, are consti-
tutional, and still can be accomplished more or less without cost. 
They exist to spread and maintain nonspeculative home ownership 
on Main Street. Set them to work on that now, and we will save Wall 
Street—and the global fi nancial system as well. At least until the next 
bubble.19
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